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Abstract
We explain why correlation crises may occur in insurance and ﬁnance. These
phenomena are not taken into account in Solvency II standard formula. We show
the importance of taking them into account in internal models or partial internal
models. Given the variety of scenarios that could lead to correlation crises and
their dierent potential impacts, we support the idea that ORSA (Own Risk and
SolvencyAssessment)reportsofinsurancecompaniesshouldincludedynamicand
causal correlation crises analyzes.
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1 Introduction
According to former French president Jacques Chirac, ”les emmerdes volent toujours en
escadrilles”. This saying (that one could translate into ”Problems always come as a
ﬂying patrol”) seems to verify both generally speaking and in ﬁnance and insurance
nowadays. The problem is that regulators and risk managers tend to underestimate
the fact that when things go bad, correlation may increase and simultaneous losses are
much more likely to occur than in the classical regime. In this paper, we aim at explain-
ing how sudden increase in correlation may occur and why it is important to take into
accountthoseso-calledcorrelationcrises(introducedinBiardetal.(2008)). Besides, we
explain why Solvency II standard formula’s correlation principle must be completed
by an additional ERM analysis. In addition to the comments of Filipovic (2009) on
the inadequate two-level correlation scheme of Solvency II, we explain why we think
that time to react is extremely important. Time for correlation to occur, for compa-
nies to anticipate the change, and for regulators to take action if needed is not usually
taken into account in risk maps or correlation maps, and we think that it should be a







































One incredible series of air crashes happened in August 2005: ﬁve crashes within
twenty-two days! On August 2, an Air France plane crashed after landing in Toronto,
309 passengers, no victim. On August 6, a Tuninter plane damaged in sea, 39 pas-
sengers, 14 dead. On August 14, a H´ elios Arways plane crashed into a mountain
near Athens, 121 passengers, no survivor. On August 16, a West-Carribean crashed in
Venezuela, 160 passengers, no survivor. On August 23, a Tans plane crashed in Ama-
zonian, 98 passengers, 40 dead. Is such a series so exceptional? Actually, not really. In
Janvresse and de la Rue (2007), it is shown that the probability for such a sequence of
ﬁve air crashes to occur within a period of twenty two days is about 11% per year.
The well known curse of Tutankhamun is another example of mysterious series of
death. It began after the excavation of Tutankhamun tomb by an archaeologist team in
November 1923. About six months later, the expedition backer Lord Carnavon died of
pneumonia. Shortly after the death of Lord Carnavon, the canary of the ﬁrst visitor of
the tomb was eaten by a cobra, the protective snake of pharaoh. Sum-total, about 30
persons related to an archaeologist died few years quite rapidly after the excavation. In
Janvresse and de la Rue (2007), one can read that this curse is the result of the focus on
the entourage of the archaeologists and that the life expectation of expedition members
is normal.
Those two examples drawn from Janvresse and de la Rue (2007) do not correspond
to correlation crises, but to clusters of unfavorable events that may occur with dier-
ent likelihoods depending on how correlated risk processes are (see Ferro and Segers
(2003) and Robert (2009) for more details). One might have the feeling that correlation
crises in insurance and ﬁnance do not really occur and that we just focus too much on
some indicators a posteriori. In this paper, we show that correlation crises do happen in
reality. We describe the dierent phenomena that can breed real correlation crises, and
we show that the potential scenarios may be very dierent from one case to the other.
Our paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present a ﬁrst source of correla-
tion crises: common shocks. In Section 3, we investigate regime switches of correlation
during crises for stock indices, credit derivatives and real-estate mortgage risk. In
Section 4, we show that correlation crises may occur simply because one common risk
source has been ignored. In Section 5, we explain how feedback loops can lead to
very sudden correlation crises. Insurance and ﬁnancial risks are often assumed to be
independent; inSection6,weshowhoweventsinoneofthesectorscanhaveimportant
consequences in the other one, sometimes after a few weeks or months. Section 7 is
devotedtocontagionandinter-connectedness, andtheconclusionsuggestsideasabout






































02 The World Trade Center Insurance Dispute
Correlation crises do occur in reality in the insurance and ﬁnance business, and the ﬁrst
reason for potential correlation crises is related to the notion of common shock: one
large event has direct consequences in several lines of business, or two or more linked
events occur at the same time. One could think about Katrina and Rita for insurance
businesses in Florida and Louisiane for example. The present section focus on the
notion of event and the risk that this notion may be modiﬁed at the court before or after
the event.
The World Trade Center project was assigned to the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. In the 1970s and early 1980s, six towers were built. In 1980, Larry
A. Silverstein, a real estate investor, won a bid from the Port Authority to construct 7
World Trade Center. In 1998, the Port Authority approved plans to privatize the World
Trade Center. Silverstein succeeded in buying the lease which is signed on July 24,
2001, only few weeks before the September 11 attacks. This lease agreement applied
to One, Two, Four and Five World Trade Center. Silverstein took insurance policies for
these four buildings with 24 insurance companies for a sum-total of $3.55 billion per
occurrence in property damage coverage. The term “occurrence” was the crux of an
importantinsurancedispute. Fromtheperspectiveofinsurers, theSeptember11attack
was one event, $3.55 billion had consequently to be paid o. From the perspective of
Silverstein, since two separate planes crashed into two separate buildings, there were
two occurrences so $7.1 billion had to be paid o. Depending on the policies of each
insurer, jury trials decided to split insurers into two groups. One group was subject to
one occurrence and the others to two occurrences.
Such an example exhibits the inﬂuence of court decisions on the insurance sector.
Depending on decisions at the court and political pressures or the inﬂuence of lobbies,
many additional, correlated claims might suddenly be reported and have to be paid.
In that case, the correlation crisis may be accompanied by an increase in the frequency
of claims.
3 Change of correlation regime during crises
Correlation between stock prices or between indices tends to increase when things go
very bad (because a crisis tends to aect most players in the market) and also when
things go very well (because then the global performance of the market becomes a
key common driver in that case). This is true during crises but also simply when the
performance of stocks or indices is lower than usually and corresponds to a smile of
correlation, comparable to the smile of volatility. In Figure 1, one can clearly see than
90-dayempiricalcorrelationbetweenDAXandDowJonesIndustrialIndexinEurosin-
creases when returns on the DAX are doing bad, in comparison to the classical average
regime. Index prices are observed from January 1999 to September 2009. DAX returns






































0Figure 1: Empirical correlation between DAX and Dow Jones based on sliding 90-day
windows as a function of DAX return
noise reduction are needed. Nevertheless correlation crises are there. A more detailed
analysis of this example is to be carried out in a separate paper.
Similarly,implicitcorrelation,forexampleoncreditcorrelationderivativesmarkets,
increased a lot during the last crisis: it jumped quite rapidly from levels around 0:4 to
levelsbetween0:95and1, andstayedatthisunusuallyhighlevelduringseveralweeks.
Solvency II standard formula does not take into account those changes of regime
of correlation when things go bad. This is why most companies which deal with risks
exposed to correlation crises have to develop internal models. This is the case for
real-estate mortgage risk. We have built a model for a company covering this risk and
we have noticed that, in this case, when things go bad, things go worse. Here is the
explanation: for real-estate mortgage risk, a real-estate crack (like in London in the
late 90’s) has a devastating eect both on the assets and the liabilities and may lead to
an unstoppable loss spiral. A real-estate crack decreases the value of the assets which
cover the commitments of the company, and induces a signiﬁcant default of policy-
holders with claims that may be 10 times superior to standards. While assets decrease,
thecapitaldoestoo, duetotechnicallosses, whichleadstoadoubledeteriorationofthe
coverage ratio. The company’s rating is therefore logically decreased, yet this rating
has a direct eect on the company’s competitiveness, due to the Basel II constraint
imposed to banks. Therefore, even if the real-estate market improves, the turnover
may be signiﬁcantly reduced and the proﬁt may be not sucient to compensate the
company’s expenses. The loss ratio keeps on decreasing, so does the capital, so does
the solvency ratio, and so on...
The Solvency II standard formula does not mention these correlations and does not






































0to detect this type of correlation crisis and to alert the Management who can then take
the only decision possible: raise capital to stop the spiral before it is too late.
4 Ignored common risk sources
Another lesson to draw from the sub-prime crisis is that securitization, if risk is not
traced, may lead to ignored correlations. The sub-prime risk, transferred, recombined,
repackaged was present in many portfolios of ﬁnancial institutions, local municipali-
ties, insurancecompanies, andinvestorsallaroundtheworld, thesestakeholdersbeing
considered as relatively independent from one another. Does securitization really at-
omize risk like the governor of California atomizes the T1000 in Terminator III? Well, it
does exactly the same: the subprime risk was split in many parts that all did not look
too frightening, but when the sub-prime crisis starts, the big risk recomposes exactly
like the bits of the T1000 melt down to regenerate it, and losses occur everywhere, in
very dierent portfolios in South America, Japan, America, Europe... In that case, risks
thatwereconsideredtoberelativelyindependentsuddenlybecomestronglypositively
correlated because of one big source of correlation that had been ignored (on purpose
or not).
Governanceriskisagoodexampleofcommonsourceofriskthatisoftenignoredor
underestimated. Many welfare institutions, pension funds or large insurance brokers
have a hybrid governance model. The group provides a certain number of common
servicestoentitieslikecommercialvendingnetworks,informationsystems(whichmay
beownedbythegroup), andsoon... Ifagovernancecrisisoccurs, theseimportanttools
might be unavailable for all entities simultaneously during a certain amount of time.
This generates potential correlation crises between operational risks of the dierent
entities, often regarded as almost independent. Let us give a ﬁctitious example: in Jan-
uary, the CEOofsucha groupstartsto divorcefromherhusband, whoownspartof the
buildings and of the subsidiaries of the company. In March her husband send her into
thecourtandsheistemporarilysenttojail. Thewholemonthisadisasterforthegroup
as the board is unable to make decisions and there is no access to information systems.
Vendors and brokers do not know which side to choose. Many entities of the group are
strongly penalized and are unable to report to the supervisor’s enquiry (which is, bad
luck, starting exactly at the same time, remember Jacques Chirac’s citation). This leads
to large operational losses for almost all entities of the group and important capital
add-ons, just before the end of March. One could argue that the company would have
three months to take preventive actions. But in reality, it would be very hard for the
Chief Risk Ocer to go and see the Chief Executive Ocer and ask her to mitigate that
risk.
Similarly, if several banks or insurance companies are temporarily in trouble, their
fatewillbeinthehandsoftheregulators. InFrance, manyexperiencedinsuranceregu-
lators recently left. It is very important to continue to have competent and experienced






































0institutions. This leads to another source of correlation crises related to governance
transfer to regulators.
But very often, risk and correlation are going to come from an unexpected direction.
Would you accept that life insurance risk in Sweden and P& C risk in South-East Asia
are close to be independent? Well, they are in general, but not in the extremes: given
that Tha¨ ıland is one of the most praised destinations for Swedish tourists, specially
during the winter season, and given that pier destruction is one of the important P&
C risks in South-East Asia, do you start to see some potential correlation source? This
ignored correlation source is of course tsunami risk. The December 2004 earthquake
and the generated tsunami caused large losses in both lines of business (almost 2 000
Swedish casualties) that were (jointly) very unlikely to occur in an independent model.
For this purpose, we developed a simple model with, on the one hand, a portfolio of
Swedish policyholders with death insurance and, on the other hand, a Cat property
coverage in Thailand. According to the independence or correlation hypothesis taken
into account in this model, the results in terms of variance and high level Value at Risk
are completely dierent: correlation can double or triple high level VaRs.
External shocks are not the only source of correlation crisis, which can be triggered
by oscillations generated and ampliﬁed within the insurance or ﬁnancial system.
5 Endogenous risk and feedback loops
5.1 Danielsson and Shin’s analogy
Another potential reason for correlation crises to occur corresponds to endogenous risk
(also called feedback risk). Endogenous risk may exist if many stakeholders in the
market are sensitive to some events, are likely to react in similar manners, and if their
coordinatedreactionshaveafeedbackimpactonthemarket. Inthatcase,viciouscycles
or feedback loops may break out. A nice example of such a phenomenon is the analogy
between the Millenium bridge wobble and the end of LTCM developed in Danielsson
and Shin (2003). Right after its opening to public in June 2000, the Millenium bridge
in London started to wobble. Oscillations reached 7 centimeters at the middle of the
bridge. It is well known that if you command an army and if your group is about to
cross a bridge, you should ask your soldiers to walk normally on the bridge. Most
recent bridges are designed to avoid vertical resonance anyway. But here, the bridge
began to sway and twist in regular oscillations. The probability for this to occur was
judged to be very small by engineers: what is the probability that ten thousands people
end up walking exactly in step? If they were independent (which was more or less the
engineers’ assumption), the probability would be close to zero. But given feedback,
the probability is actually close to 1: as it can be read on the BBC website, engineers
discovered that the sideways forces of the pedestrians’ footsteps created a slight horizontal wob-
ble in the bridge. As the structure began moving, pedestrians adjusted their gait to the same
lateral rhythm as the bridge. The adjusted footsteps magniﬁed the motion - just like when four






































0rhythm, the increasing oscillations led to the dramatic swaying. Danielsson and Shin (2003)
compare this phenomenon to adverse price moves that the fund LTCM had to cope
with in the late nineties: instead of being the perfect storm, what happened on the mar-
ket was quite likely to occur given feedback. The fund LTCM, considered as a central
bank of liquidity, was ruled by John Meriwether and by several Nobel prize winners.
Its early success came from convergence trade: as spreads between some instruments
(like government bonds issued at dierent dates) are theoretically converging towards
maturity, it is possible to take long positions in the cheapest and short positions in the
most expensive. As many copycat hedge funds did the same and as LTCM became
huge, many stakeholders in the market had the same risk proﬁle. Pre-conditions for
feedback loop were in construction. During the Asian and Russian crises, this feed-
back loop became reality. According to Danielsson and Shin (2003), As the convergence
trades were unwound, the long positions were sold, and the short positions were bought back.
This entailed adverse price shocks for all other traders that started out with similar positions.
For some traders whose leverage was high relative to capital, this would entail losses on their
positions sucient to trigger margin calls on their losing positions. They would be forced to
unwind their trades, which tended to reinforce the adverse price moves. Given the huge levels
of leverage and the widespread nature of the trades, the vicious feedback loop was gradually set
in motion in which adverse price moves led to liquidations, which further fed the adverse price
moves. Schematically, we would have the following feedback loop where market distress would
feed on itself: Margin Calls ! Unwind Leveraged Trades ! Distress ! Adverse Price Move
! Margin Calls ! :::
To sum up, the fact that market participants are often exposed to similar risks and
to similar liquidity conditions makes correlation crises even likely. This corresponds to
this quote from Richard Bookstaber: ”Global markets may actually be more risky than
in the past, as the same types of investors are taking on the same type of risky bets and
then simultaneously heading for the exits when trouble comes”. However, one must
nuance this point of view. A single huge investment fund can be as dangerous as a
multitude of copycat small investors (apart from the fact that it is maybe more visible,
but on the other hand more inﬂuent): size is also a problem (the size of LTCM would
have made the feedback loop appear anyway probably even if there was not a single
copycat fund). The fact that large ﬁnancial groups may instigate systemic risk supports
the shift of some regulators from ”too big to fail” and ”too interconnected to fail” to
merely ”too big”.
Like in the LTCM case, automatic margin calls between ﬁnancial institutions could
occur, andcomputersmightbeatthecenterofafeedbackloopthatmightemptytotally
thecashofaninstitutionwithinafewhours. Suchscenariosmustabsolutelybestudied
by central banks to mitigate this risk, because of the extreme speed at which the whole
process may take place.
An even more extremely fast and so dangerous feedback loop could be created
by algorithmic trading. Trading platforms propose now transactions concluded by






































0extreme event occurs, the machine could go crazy before one has time to unplug it.
We still do not know whether this type of event was the cause of the ﬂash crash at the
New-YorkstockexchangeonMay6th2010. Circuitbreakersmightbeapartialsolution
to this kind of problem, as long as they prove to be ecient and as long as contagion
to other assets does not have time to develop before trading is halted.
5.2 Surrender risk and arbitrage risk
Feedback loops might also cause policyholders to panic and to surrender contracts,
causing more distress and more rumors about the insurance company, leading to more
surrenders, and so on... Decisions of policyholders to surrender are more or less inde-
pendentfromoneanothergivensomeeconomicfactorintheclassicalregime. However,
in a stressed scenario, it is unlikely that this remains true. Loisel and Milhaud (2010)
explain why the distribution of lapse rates may be far from being Gaussian in stressed
scenarios, and could be modeled by a bi-modal distribution. In that case, everything
depends on the reputation of the insurer or of the insurance industry, which may be
aectedbypoliticaldeclarations. Decisionsofpolicyholdersarethenindependentcon-
ditionally to this factor, which leads to a limit distribution which is no longer Gaussian
but bi-modal, as the central limit theorem cannot be applied directly. Bank deposits
are subject to the same risk, and feedback risk is also an important feature of these
activities. Other examples of this phenomenon are the long line at the Northern bank
last year, or previous runs in Australian market. The time for insurers to react might
be in really extreme scenarios extended by the regulator that can (in France for ex-
ample following the Code de l’Assurance) enforce the suspension of payments of the
surrender values to policyholders by the insurer as long as the situation is not under
control. Thisleadsbacktotheproblemsrelatedtogovernanceriskinextremescenarios
discussed in the previous section. Apart from surrender risk, other types of copycat
policyholder behavior may penalize insurance companies at bad instants.
A curious correlation crisis has emerged after the last ﬁnancial crisis. If the devel-
opment of life insurance over the last ten years seemed to follow the same virtuous
path in most countries, this business model has taken a serious hit and the crisis had
the insurers biting the bullet. Up to the ﬁnancial crisis, the business goes in the di-
rection of strong development of unit linked or variable products. This development
was not without cause and was often encouraged by governments (case of the so called
”Fourgouslaw”inFranceprovidingsometaxbreakstopolicyholdermovingfromeuro
denominated to unit linked contracts): for a policyholder abandoning what they see as
a meagre 4% return compared to the strong performances of stocks was a clever coup.
It was best of both worlds for insurers: as unit linked transfers part of the risk to the
policyholder, solvency requirements are lower for this line of product. The impact of
increased sales on solvency margin was sort of mitigated by the increased share of unit
linked in the new business or in the in force (in case of existing business transfer). This
created a sort of ”balanced growth path” for insurance companies, allowing growing
and maintaining their rate of return on capital. The impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on






































0mined a strong fall in unrealized gains, which constitute part of the solvency capital
of the company, tightening their overall solvency to minimal level. In some cases, the
fall created a situation close to insolvency. On the other side, the policyholders have
strongly reacted to the loss of value of their unit-linked contracts and have shifted back
to euro denominated products, where they see a lower but safer return. For insurance
companies, the consequence is an adverse (often unanticipated) correlation: more risks
due to guarantees and less free assets to cover it due to lower assets value. Moreover,
insurers cannot rely any more on government bonds to provide returns in line with
policyholders’ expectations, increasing overall risk of their balance sheet. To sum it
up, the crisis increased the volatility and risk of the assets, lowered the capital avail-
able to cover risks and determined a new appetite of customers for products requiring
more capital for companies. In this case, marketing and ﬁnancial events are heavily
correlated and have negative impact on strength of the insurance companies.
6 Correlation between insurance and ﬁnancial risks
An Italian woman could have been the miracle woman of the year 2009 if her destiny
had not caught her. In June 2009, an Italian couple missed the infamous Flight 447
from Rio to Paris for being late. This plane crashed during its ﬂight with no survivor.
They succeeded in catching a ﬂight from Rio to Munich the following day. On their
homeward bound between Munich and Merano (North of Italy), in Kufstein (Austria),
their car veered across a road and swerved into an oncoming truck. The woman died
and her husband was seriously injured.
In that case, one gets the impression that the ﬁrst event, even if it is not lethal, does
create an additional risk for the immediate future because part of the protection of the
individuals is gone (they are tired and probably shocked by what they just escaped).
This kind of event could lead to a correlation crisis between insurance and ﬁnance: im-
mediately after the occurrence of a large insurance catastrophe, reserves of insurance
companies will be low. If a ﬁnancial crisis happens to strike a few days later, the cash
reserves usually available on the insurance side of bancassurers, coming from collected
premium income, could be unavailable for banks in the need. Even if insurers are not
the only source of cash for banks during crises, this could make things much worse
for some bancassurers and even generate some indirect systemic risk from the banking
sector. So, even if the insurance industry is unlikely to be the instigator of systemic risk
(as pointed out by Weiss (2010)), the above mentioned correlation clearly contributes
to the systemic risk faced by the global economy.
Some correlations or indirect eects are more diuse in time. For example, it is al-
most impossible to detect extreme insurance events like September 11, Katrina or Kobe
earthquake by looking at monthly returns of stock indices. However, those events do
have an impact on the global economy: after September 11 or London 2005 terrorist
attacks, it was hard to purchase aordable reinsurance during several semesters, and






































0impact on the global economy that is dicult to measure though.
There are however some diuse correlation eects between extreme ﬁnancial and
insurance risks that are possible to measure. Barrieu and Albertini (2009) examine
prices of insurance-linked securities (ILS) between 2000 and 2009. After September 11,
as reinsurance is almost impossible to ﬁnd, the prices of insurance-linked securities
rise. They then start to go down up to Katrina in 2005, which makes them go up again.
Once again, after a while they get slightly lower, up to a major pure ﬁnancial event:
Lehmann’s failure in 2008. After this ﬁnancial earthquake, it is almost impossible to
ﬁnd reliable collaterals, and the prices of insurance-linked securities increase a lot. This
is a clear correlation between insurance and ﬁnancial extreme risks, with consequences
during several semesters, and in that case the primary event is a ﬁnancial disaster.
7 How to take into account correlation crises ?
7.1 ERM Risk Maps
As said in Institute of Management Accountants (2007) “One weakness in risk maps
(and in silo risk management) is that maps do not capture any risk correlations. Ignor-
ing risk correlations can lead to ineective and inecient risk management.”
In Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), a classical risk map represents risks by likeli-
hood on the x-axis and by severity (or impact) on the y-axis. It is a ﬁrst overview of the
company risk exposure and the beginning of an overall risk strategy, but unfortunately
does not incorporate the cost of the mitigating strategies or risk controls. This problem
must be overcome particularly in a dynamic setting where the trade-o between risk
and average proﬁt has even more consequences on the position of the company after a
few years. The risk map is a photography of a risk landscape at a ﬁxed date. In order
to face the static nature, some risk maps include trends like “increasing”, “decreasing”,
or “stable”. In World Economic Forum (2009), risk correlations are taken into account
through a new map structure: a Risk Interconnection Map. This report tries to answer
two major questions: how inter-connected are risks, and how may they evolve over
time? These two questions are the crux of a ecient risk management, and so the more
complicated.
Both ﬁnance and insurance risks are highly connected to environmental, societal or
international conﬂict risks. The understanding of these linkages allows the risk man-
ager ﬁrst to catch the global risk exposure of its company, and secondly to foresee the
evolution of these connections. On the contrary, neglecting risk connections may have
serious consequences, as during the subprime crisis.
7.2 Interconnectedness maps
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has underlined the problem of a company that is too con-






































0delivered by governments that they may intervene to keep aﬂoat an institution too
connected to fail, can encourage investor and manager risk-taking. The multiple link-
age aspect raises the problem of the systemic impact of an institution failure. In Cont
and Moussa (2009); Bastos and Cont (2009), the authors try to capture this eect for
a ﬁnancial institution through a “Systemic Risk Index”. This index is based on the
eects of common market factors aecting defaults, default contagion via counterparty
risks, and indirect contagion via credit default swaps. The Brazilian bank sector is
taken as a network example. Contagion can also be modeled by extensions of David
and Lo’s model (see Rulli` ere et al. (2010)). After the “too big to fail” principle, the
“too interconnected to fail” principle is a new brain-teaser for ﬁnancial regulators and
governments. A new American database could be soon created to get a better vision
of interconnections between ﬁnancial institutions in the United States. At the interna-
tional level, some studies put in perspective the interconnectedness of the American
and Chinese economies (see Ye (2010)).
8 Conclusion: towards dynamic risk maps
We have seen in the dierent previous sections that correlation crises could take mul-
tiple forms, have dierent speeds and dierent sources, outside or inside the ﬁnancial
system. To be able to put risk controls in place, some more information is needed: in
particular, the chronology of events and the opportunity to anticipate the following
consequences are very important. Therefore, beyond correlation, risk analyzes should
include descriptions of realistic crisis scenarios in a dynamic setting. As a conclusion,
not only do we need to take into account correlation crises, but we must also be able
to describe their causes and how they are going to materialize during time for each
line of business. The opportunity to react is not only guaranteed by the time avail-
able to do so, but also by the liquidity conditions during the crisis, that are likely to
be modiﬁed. Hierarchical Archimedean copulas that feature strong tail dependence
like the hierarchical Clayton copula are used in some internal risk models and may be
a ﬁrst approach to take into account potential correlation crises in the one year time
horizon. Interconnection maps may give an idea of the links between banks, insur-
ance companies or national economies. Nevertheless, these tools do not provide any
information on the primary cause of the crisis and on the way events develop, both in
terms of marginal risks and in terms of correlations. To encourage the development
of dynamic risk maps, we believe that regulators should encourage the use of global
multi-period crisis scenarios where the insurance company is placed in the context of
the global economy in the Own Solvency and Risk Assessment (ORSA) reports that
insurance companies will soon have to provide. The time scale should be adapted to
each studied scenario (e.g. seconds or minutes for algorithmic trading operational risk,
days of weeks for surrender risk, semesters or years for inﬂation risk). Multiple time
scales might have to be used for combined scenarios involving correlation patterns
that are more diuse in time, like the ones stemming from the impact of terrorism and
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